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GROUPS IN PERSPECTIVES
CAROL WEISBROD*

The following comment is in effect part of a continuing conversation
with Avi Soifer, Milner Ball and others, on problems of groups and
communities and the American legal system. The specific citations here to
Soifer's previous work only begin to show my intellectual indebtedness.
The basic argument inthe principal paper is to the effect that increased
sensitivity to group history by judges will result in better decisions concerning
groups, and particularly involuntary groups which have been victimized by
the larger society.
This comment takes as its text several sentences in the principal paper
in order to raise questions which go in somewhat different directions from
the main paper.
ONE: Judges sometimes show a "willed obliviousness towards history"
which "co-exists awkwardly with recent judicial activism in constructing the
very categories the judges elsewhere consider immutable, natural groupings,
that is, race, tribes and families." '
This proposition invokes the idiom of social construction and raises this
question: are there natural immutable groups and the problem is that the
judiciary has been inadequately sensitive in locating them? or are there no
such things in fact, (so that everything is a social construction and there is
nothing to locate but only something to create) so that the problem becomes
which construction should judges reinforce and with what degree of candor
should they make these choices?
Initially, one might raise a question about the meaning of the term
"involuntary group" From whose point of view are such groups involuntary? We could say that we are born into many natural ,groups, and that
the job of courts is to identify and sometimes assign priorities to1 our
memberships. Or we could say, with David Copperfield, that we were simply
born, and that social constructions start immediately, with "time" and
"place" and "people" in roles around us.
Let us look briefly at the situation of the family. It is what is called
the natural family, Avi Soifer points out, which underlies the court's opinion
in a recent case on a presumption of legitimacy 2. A broader view of history,
he suggests, would yield the point that there are many kinds of family in
America. But a still broader view might suggest that it is not merely that
there are many kinds of family but also that the immediate relations between

* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.

I. Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups and the AngloAmerican Judicial Tradition, 48 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 381, 395 (1991).
2. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (giving particularly interesting discussion
of explicit problem of which level of generality should be used when courts look for relevant
traditions and forms).
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parents and children-the natural biological family-are not as quite as
solid and unconstructed as the discussion of the biological family typically
suggests. It is not necessary to go to science fiction or the inquiries of
anthropologists-looking perhaps for tribes with two sexes but five genders,
or groups that locate themselves in families in time (ancestor connections,
descendent connections) rather than in space-to find the suggestion that
the nuclear family itself is not to be taken as given. If you don't have a
good father, Nietzche wrote, acquire another one. 3 Sterne offered a legal
debate over the relationship, if any, between mother and child.4 And
fifteenth and sixteenth century paintings show the family of Jesus as a
matriarchal line from the grandmother to her daughters as mothers and
their children.'
The naturalness of the grouping, then, may always be in question. And
there is nothing necessarily immutable about it. Lawrence Friedman has
argued that in this culture more and more appears to be voluntary, 6 and
where the situation is not voluntarily chosen initially, we understand the
relation as something which we can avoid. In the same way that husbands
and wives can divorce, children can be emancipated, and can be adopted,
even as adults.
Certainly one can argue that some affiliations are involuntary from the
point of view of some particular group. And perhaps not merely involuntary
to begin with, but irrevocable. But from another point of view-that quite
possibly of the state, for example-even these affiliations are understood
as voluntary to a considerable degree. We see religious7 affiliation in terms
of volition. Gender identification is subject to change.
And of course, even the natural biological fact-for example, skin
color-has a constructed social meaning. All the red-haired left-handed,
green-eyed people of the world could be natural groups, stigmatized or
worse, yet in this culture are not. (In some other culture, of course, they
may be.) In a sense groups are always constructed. Out of the countless

3. F. NmTzscH, HUMAN ALL Too HUMAN 381 (1878). If one does not have a good
father, he should acquire one. Id. at 382. Fathers have much to do to make amends, for the

fact that they have sons. So, even the good father one has acquired, standing in the (social)
role of father, has much to be sorry about. The critical point being not the biological (natural)
but the social role?
4. L. STmEN, Tim LIF AND OPNIoNs OF TlSmA .mSHANDY (1950). "It has not only
been a question, Captain Shandy, amongst the best lawyers and civilians in this land ...
'[w]hether the mother be of kin to her child,'-but after much dispassionate enquiry and
actitation of the arguments on all sides-it has been adjudged for the negative-namely, That
the mother is not of kin to her child."' Id. at 339 (footnotes omitted). Uncle Toby (and the
vulgar) remain of the opinion, however, that there is "some sort of consanguinity" between
the mother and her son. Id. at 342. This suggests that the learned, including the judges, are
not the final authorities on such questions.
5. See P. SHEINGoRN, APPROPRIATING THE HOLY KINSHIP IN K. ASHLEY & P. SHEINOGaN
EDS, INTERPRETING CULTURAL SYMBOLS: SAINT ANNE IN LATE MEDIEVAL SocIETY 173 (1990).
6. L. FREEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE (1990).
7. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 89-90 (noting that immutability is "not
so obvious a concept as it seems at first glance.").
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relations into which a human being is born, these particular relations are
identified by some culture, larger or smaller, as important.
If everything is constructed, courts, like the rest of us, cannot look
"at" society. 8 Courts, like the rest of us, are always in effect looking
through society and culture at something (or nothing). And the problem
judges have in dealing with the real truth of the world and the image of
the world in law is rather similar to the problem judges have in dealing
with the idea of law in general. For it seems to me that it is really quite
like the question whether judges discover or make law. Judges may be more
or less sympathetic to litigants, more or less appreciative of historical
materials. They also may be more or less engaged in prudential calculations
involved in the emphasis on the socially conventional as natural rather than
as constructed. Another way to say this is that when we start using the
language of social construction, we might recall that the role of the judge
is also a social construction, one which at times may impose its own
conditions. 9
Consideration of the outer reaches of social construction takes us past
reformist and even utopian thinking into science fiction and metaphysics,
speculative writing that considers whether ultimate reality involves eternal
recurrence,10 or whether our memories have been implanted by a robotics
engineer,' or whether time in fact runs in the direction opposite to that of
our ordinary understanding.12 And in the same way that these speculations
are not the basis of most utopian writing-utopian blueprints are in a sense
practical-they are not, finally, the basis of legal writing. Simmel, comparing
Law and Fashion, said that in effect they were both based on the externals
of life, those parts turned to society. 3 Fashion was a framework, he said,
within which we seek our inner lives. So too is law. The law behaves as
though what we sit on is a solid chair, as if time runs forward, as if the
raw data' 4 of the past is to a significant degree knowable, whether or not

8. K. LLEwELLYN, BRAmtaE BUSH (1960). "Courts sometimes look directly at society,
sometimes at the work of other courts." Id. at 59.
9. For one description of that social construction, see P. BEROER & T. LucKMANN,
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REAI 76-77 (1967).
10. See P. OUsPENsKY, STANGE Lam

OF

IVAN OsomNr (1947). For the same theme in

another idiom, see also M. BISHOP, We Have Been Here Before, Tan BEST OF BISHOP 39

(1980).
11. P. DICK, BLADE RUNNER (Do ANDROIDS DEAEm OF ELECTRC SxEE) (1968).
12. B. AxDmms, CRYP'rozoic! (1967).
13. G. Smua, ON INDimuAI=rrY AN SOCIAL Foos 314 (1971).

14. We can and do talk and even debate about who "won" a war without raising the
possibility of entirely alternate universes in which variant parties might have said (be saying)
on variant facts that they "won."
Changing interpretations and perspectives are imposed on the raw facts. We are always
asking new questions of the data. We can talk about senses in which people who say they
won did not really win. Or we can look at things with different eyes. Thus, Bellamy's EQUALITY

contains a conversation in which the interrogator asks about settlements upon nationalization
of property and is told that the people waived a settlement: There were no executions. E.
BELLAMY, EQUALTY 373-74 (1897).
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it is usable. Law is about the daily understanding of things, and operates
at the level at which people do or do not sleep under bridges and steal
bread. But the loosening of our categories which the science fiction questions
make possible may perform a serious function for us, because it facilitates
a consideration of the world in which the state is not the only significant
power and in which groups may be seen as having sovereignty of their
own."
TWO: "Deciding who is a member of a family or a tribe is basic, yet
such a question is never free of difficulty." Moreover, "deference to tribal

or family norms, at least as judges perceive such norms to be, may ' defeat
6
principles as important as the elimination of gender discrimination."'

This point inevitably raises the conflict of norms between the group
and the larger society. The context which Soifer addresses in this paper is
largely that of a larger society involved in the persecution of a minority

group. Soifer here sees minorities as oppressed and victimized-as of course
is, in a way, about the urgency that misery
they often are-and his paper
7
gives to politics and to law.

In other contexts, of course, we might see groups less benignly, and
even as oppressive.

8

When we are concerned with protecting the rights of

minorities, which rights are we concerned about? Those rights may have to
do with ideas of security and freedom from persecution, or with ideas of
preservation of minority culture. 9
The American system does not assume that differences will go away in

a perfect world. Nor does it assume that in a perfect world the social
construction of biological characteristics will tend to ignore differences. Its

conception of a group therefore implicates the problem of group autonomy,
the right of the group itself to maintain its separateness. With this there is

15. On the model of competing sovereignties, see Weisbrod, Family, Church and State:
An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. F A. L. 741 (1987). The idea
of sovereignty in groups other than the state requires that "willing suspension of disbelief for
the moment" to which Coleridge referred. See S. ColmunGE, 2 BiooRAPiA LrrEm.RsA XIV

(1817, Shawcross ed. 1907, 1968). In this context, as in others (most obviously narrative
scholarship), the suspension of disbelief is for the purpose of seeing something which might
otherwise be missed. The work of critical analysis is still to be done. In the present context,
one must raise questions about the kinds of groups we might be talking about (churches,
unions, races, assemblages on a street comer), and consider what self-regulation might mean
in different contexts.
16. Soifer, supra note 1, at 406.
17. See Soifer, Towards a Generalized Notion of the Right of Freedom of Association:
An Essayfor Tom Emerson, 38 CAsE W. R. 641, 653 (1988) (using this "misery and politics"
as part of a subheading).
18. "Small groups may be far more oppressive to the individual then larger ones,"
Morris R. Cohen wrote. And again, "the evils of an absolute state are not cured by the
multiplication of absolutes." See Soifer, Freedom of Association: Indian Tribes, Workers and
Communal Ghosts, 48 M. L. REv. 350 (1989). Compare Cohen's later view on groups and
the state in M. COHEN, THE MEANiNo OF Hui,*_ HISTORY (1947).
19. See A. PrnEus, LAW AND SocIAL ACTION 223 (1950) (noting that the first and basic
right of minorities was that of "fully preserving their minority characteristics.").
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a major difficulty. The group itself may be operating as a small government.
This government may be doing things which the larger group thinks are
bad. As a small government it impacts on its own citizens (its members) in
ways that the larger society believes are harmful to them. Shall we say that
small group autonomy should be restricted so that the individual shall be
saved? that the individual should be sacrificed so that small group autonomy
shall be saved?2° At bottom, it surely depends on whether we are more
concerned about the power of the group or the power of the state. Have
we gone much further than Chafee in leaving the matter in the form of a
construction noting that on the one hand there was one argument and on
2
the other, another argument? '
The problems of the group and the larger society go beyond the
important issue of possible oppression of individuals in the group by the
group itself. Thus, the principal paper notes that the judges may have
difficulty in figuring out what the norms of the groups actually, authentically, are.22 A further difficulty is that even when we do somehow feel
confident about knowing what the tribal rules are, we may be preserving
group autonomy for the sake of dubious objectives of the larger society,
for example institutionalizing second class citizenship for members of the
group.Y The insistence that group law, and in fact meaning of any kind,
must be rooted in a particular historically formed community can be made
in a political context that makes it an argument with troublesome and even
fearful consequences. 24 If it is a mistake to declare a situation of factual
equality prematurely, as Soifer has argued, it is equally dangerous (as Soifer
would certainly agree) to be sensitive to manifestations of group life without

20. See L. TamE,

CONsnUONAL LAW 898 (Ist ed. 1978).
21. See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv.

993 (1930) The tension Chafee sets up is between a view of the state as ruler or arbiter over
all other groups and the view of the state as one more association, which charges rather high
dues. Note that Chafee wrote in 1930, before the expansion of federal power through the New
Deal. Our expectations of the federal government in general are much greater now than when
he wrote.
22. Soifer, supra note 1, at 406 (citing Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 671 (1989)).
23. See L. ScHApi~o, RussN STuDms 57-58 (1986) (discussing freeing of serfs and
problem of legal status of peasant commune). "Within this commune the peasants were
preserved in a status which set them apart from the rest of society.... Subject to special
courts and special laws euphemistically called customary law, and in practice often little more
than arbitrary rough and ready paternal management, the Russian peasant remained largely
untouched by the newly established legal order." Id.
24. See 3 S. SIMsON & J. STONE, CASEs AND REnaNos oN LAw AND SocmTY 1627
(1949) (quoting Ernst Krieck). Ernst Krieck, a Nazi philosopher, stated: "There is no [absolute]
truth which is the same for the German, the Chinese, the Hindu, the Jew, the Negro or
American Indian-not even in mathematics or in the presence of natural laws. There is,
however, a truth begotten and born, brought to the light of consciousness by creative men,
conforming to the obligatory [racial] conception of the nature of man and the world-a truth
valid for fellow-members of the race, for men who live as part of the same folkish community
and under the same historic destiny." Id. (brackets in original).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:437

some underlying regard for the universal human values associated with
individualism and egalitarianism. Those interested in groups and in group
life must somehow deal with issues arising from the large difference between
those who see issues of pluralism (for example, religious exemption) as
something almost inevitably involving (ultimately, if not immediately) license
to steal or kill and those who see such questions in terms of making room

wherever possible for creativity and autonomous expression in a mass
society. 25 In general, the conversation on pluralism must somehow begin
with the acknowledgement that, as Harold Isaacs put it, "with all the beauty
'26
goes all the blood.
Debate in the United States on these issues (which looks to the discussion

in international settings) is very much alive, some of it taking place in the
context of a discussion of the free exercise clause,27 some of it taking the

form of thinking about the utility of state action ideas, some in discussion
of the "cultural defense."

We are still discussing as a matter of state,

federal, statutory and constitutional law, the complex issues of whether
private organizations can discriminate on the basis of race or religion, or
whether, for example, the desire to marry within your own racial or religious

group is a form of racist behavior. Do "we" think anything on these
subjects, or are these issues, like other difficult problems in the society,
questions about which there is no consensus?

I suspect the latter. And the problem is made worse by the fact that at
a certain level, we are not comfortable discussing it.29 We are deeply
interested in the phenomenon of groups and the role of groups in the
society, while being deeply distrustful of any idea of group characteristics,

and we focus often on gray areas.

0

In response to a form of argument

25. Lon Fuller suggested in the 1930s that one's view of folk-ways, for example, might
be quite different depending on whether one was looking through the optic of commercial
law, or the criminal law. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1934). See
Milner Ball on the point that the danger is not anarchy but majoritarian power. Ball, Soifer's
Vision and Three Questions About Images, 48 WASH. & LEE L. PEv. 429, 430-32 (1991).
26. H. IsAACs, IDOLS OF THE TamE: GRoup IDENTITY AND POLICAL CHANGE 216 (1989).
27. See generally McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
Cm. L. 1Ev. 1109 (1990); Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercism Revisionism, 58
U. Cm. L. REv. 308 (1991); P. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right to Religious Exemptions:
An Historical Perspective (unpublished manuscript).
28. See Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and the Constitution: In Defense of the State
Action Doctrine, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 129. Attacks on significance of the state action limitation
in theory (not, of course, in judicial practice) in various contexts emerge from Critical Legal
Studies and Feminist materials. See, e.g., Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REF.. 835 (1985) This approach has often been related to the argument of
the legal realists on state action, to the effect that "private" behavior which the state permitted
was also a form state action.
29. As Soifer once noted, we are reluctant to discuss what Cohen called group-marks.
Soifer has in other papers discussed the danger of certain forms of group life. See Soifer,
supra note 18, at 353.
30. European integration and international trade generally, however, has brought a new
immediacy to discussions of national character in a commercial context. See, e.g., G. KENNEDY,

1991]

COMMENT

which tends in the opposite direction, and suggests that all deviation is
major, dangerous and a threat to the social order, we focus on the arguably
normless middle range. One way or another it seems that the strongest
conventional examples of religious behavior that might be condemned under
an action-belief dichotomy have become problematic. Our leading example
had been, traditionally, 19th century Mormon polygamy. Under the impact
of current events in the area of divorce and nonmarital living arrangements,

it is relatively simple to say that 19th century Mormon marriage was not
given a fair hearing." But what case has replaced that case on the spectrum?
Other examples of free exercise problems seem relatively nonthreatening.
The recently decided Smith case32 involved religious use of peyote. As
McConnell suggested recently, some of the horribles in these discussions are
not horribles." The Sikh turban cases surely involve behavior we could live

with.
Perhaps for this reason, to put back on the table the possibility of
religious groups not of the middle range, we might recall Carthage. 4 Will
we say that even here, the culture must be judged against its reasons, so
that the infanticide of Carthage was perhaps merely on balance wrong, and3
that Delenda est Carthago was perhaps a somewhat excessive reaction? "
Whatever the answer to the problem of the sources of our moral judgments,
clearly we do not gain much, for example, by discussing the free exercise
problems as though all our cases involved small and apparently innocuous
deviations from standard dress codes (apparently, of course, because we
live by symbols, and the smallest may invoke the largest). Clearly Carthage-

or the questions involved, for example, in medical care for children of
religious groups-presents rather different issues.
The problem of the respect to be paid to group life involves serious
questions for a political society. We can say that we focus on the issues of
conflict of standards not so much because these conflicts occur frequently,
83 (1985) (discussing many cultural approaches to negotiation, including
American approaches, under heading: "Have a good day in the US of A or wham barn it's
a deal, Sam.").
31. On the current discussion, see Johnson, Polygamists Emerge from Secrecy, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 9, 1991, at 22, col. 1; Joseph, My Husband's Nine Wives, N.Y. Times, May 23,
1991, at A31, col. 1.
32. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
33. See McConnell, supra note 26, at 1141. Note that Jonestown, a generally conceded
"horrible," is also a case understood in terms of pathology so extreme that it is out of the
range of ordinary discussion.
34. See G.K. CHE RTON, EvRLuAsmNGo MAN 145 (18th printing 1955). Chesterton wrote,
"These highly civilized people really met together to invoke the blessing of heaven on their
empire by throwing hundreds of their infants into a large furnace. We can only realize the
combination by imagining a number of Manchester merchants with chimney-pot hats and
mutton-chop whiskers, going to church every Sunday at eleven o'clock to see a baby roasted
alive." Id.
35. See J. DRYDEN, PLUTARCH'S Lrvs (A. Clough ed. 1910). Note also that another
Rorhan thought that Carthage should stand. The film director Jean Renois said, "You see, in
this world, there is one awful thing, and that is that everyone has his reasons." Quoted in
Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 383, 397 (1981).
NEGOTiATE ANYwimRE!
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but because they "stick out." '3 6 But we do best, I think, discussing groups
with an eye on both positive and negative aspects. And we cannot, as
Martha Minow suggested in another context, end with the implication that
hard problems would go away if we all behaved well towards each other.17
The Soifer work takes us to the need for sophisticated analysis, historical
and theoretical, in dealing with these questions. Certainly we should know
more. We must know more about the experience of groups with the larger
culture, more about the way groups view their own culture and, for example,
the way they locate themselves in the history of the world." But knowing
more, while making our judicial texts less vulnerable to attack by (other)
mandarins, will not necessarily make the decisions we must make more
obvious to us. History may, in fact, suggest that our decisions, formal
judicial decisions, are less significant over the long run than we might think.
I doubt, for example, that the Supreme Court has precluded actual contacts
between father and biological daughter in the Michael H case. (Soifer's
discussion focuses on a legal relation.) It was presumably poor relations
between the relevant adults that created the problem to start with. And
better relations should make association between the adults and the child
possible, no matter what the Supreme Court says.3 9 Family law cases are
well-known in which a court said X and the parties one way or anotherresponding to the Court which was to begin with responding to them-said
Y.40 The Morgan case, 4' most recently litigated in New Zealand, involved a
good deal of self-help, one way and another. The courts are not the only
ones to decide these questions.
This brings me to the last point, the problem of determining group
membership. As Soifer says, we want to know who is asking and why. This
possibility, that different people may be asking, raises the point that
membership is decided by many different groups. The Jewish legal tradition
defines Jews. So does the state of Israel. So does an individual testator. 42
36. See G.D.H. COLE, Loyalties PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOLELIAN Soc=~r 151, 155

(1926); see also Weisbrod, PracticalPolyphony, 24 GA. L. REv. 985 (1990) (discussing English
pluralism).
37. Minow, Speaking and Writing Against Hate, 11 CARnozo L. Rv. 1393, 1402 (1990).
38. The larger group may be incidentally benefitted from such awareness of group
history. Knowledge of Indian legends may for example help us locate ourselves in geologic
time. See Blakeslee, Geologists See Huge Quake Risk in the Northwest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5,
1991, at 12, col. I (discussing possibility of earthquakes in Northwest). No such quakes have
occurred since the European settlement, but Indians legends speak of them.
39. Thus, there seems to be an essential realism in Justice Stevens observation in Michael
H. v. Gerald D. that the case was basically about whether the mother would be allowed "to
decide whether the child's best interest would be served by allowing the natural father visitation
privileges." 491 U.S. 110, 112 (1989).
40. See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390 (1966), in which the grandparents
won and the grandson nonetheless returned to his father later.
41. Morgan v. Foretich, 546 A.2d 407 (D.C. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007
(1989).
42. K. SHMPo, POEMS OF A JEw (1958). "No one has been able to define Jew, and in
essence this defiance of definition is the central meaning of Jewish consciousness." M.
GLANTER, A Dissent on Brother Daniel COMMENTARY 10-17 (1963).
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So did the Nazis. 43 The question is how the definition is enforced, in what
context, by what group. The state does not decide a membership question
as a general matter, once and for all, but only who is a member for some
particular state purpose" as to which, in theory, it has effective remedies.
As to the multiple enforcement mechanisms, some will be "private" and
allowed, some will be tortious (for example, shunning, the sanction of a
private religious group which may also be a tort under state law, with or
without a free exercise defense), 4 some will be criminal. Some will be public
and administered by state agencies, which already reflect a good deal of
interpenetration of private group interest as part of the political process. A
basic point here is that these ideas of membership have some relation to
ideas of citizenship, perhaps, as Nisbet argued, because they are a kind of
citizenship. This idea of citizenship is, Nisbet said, "rooted in the groups
46
and communities within which human beings actually live."
Perhaps I can conclude with a comment addressing the direct framework
of Avi Soifer's paper, the American constitutional system and the American
conception of rights protected within a rule of law. Of course I agree with
Avi Soifer that it is necessary to remember group life, the life of our own
groups, natural as we often think them, and involuntary as we also sometimes think them. Also, we might remember another way of thinking about
our groups, which includes our groups by identification and appropriation, 47
as Robert Cover once put it, those groups which we claim as part of our
past and our understanding of ourselves. With this broader set of group
identifications in our minds, it may become clearer to us that as a general
matter, the special protection of minorities in the sense that Avi Soifer has
discussed it is a prime directive for countries that are governed by the rule
of law. 48 Other questions are raised in other dimensions of this problem,
however, particularly in relation to pluralist theory. John Hostetler, in a
discussion held at Washington and Lee some years ago, commented on the
issue of the Amish and the larger society, making inter alia the following

43. See on Nazi definitions, NAziSM: A HISTORY IN Docuammrs AND EYEWrNESS AcCOUNTS 530 (J.Noakes & G. Pridham ed. 1983); I. MULLER, HITLER's JUSTICE 98-99 (1991);
R. WEISBERo, TIE FAILURE OF THE WORD (1984). On the definitions of individuals, see Gordon
v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955).

44. See Galanter, Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary, PHnLosoPHY

EAST

&

WEST, 467-87, vol. 21, no. 4 (Oct. 1971).

45. See Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975).
46. R. NISBET, TBE TwILoH OF AUTHoRTY 286 (1975) (noting that this idea which he
identifies as Aristotelian-as opposed to unitary citizenship idea of Plato-was involved in the
work of Burke, Hegel but also Kropotkin). In THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION Nisbet notes that
decentralization is similarly of interest to thinkers conventionally classified on the right and
left. R. NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 111-15 (1966).
47. See Cover, Obligations, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65, 103 (1987). The word "appropriation,"
with its questioning of "right," suggests that there may be issues of suitability in these
appropriations.
48. See Lipson, Piety and Revision: How Will the Mandarins Survive Under the Rule
of Law?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 191, 197 (1990) (discussing responsibility of majoritarian
regimes towards minorities, addressing particularly events in Soviet public life).
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points: "It is clear that the Amish will not tolerate the removal of their
children from their homes to distant schools where they are placed in large
groups with narrow age limits, taught skills useless to their way of life and
exposed to values contradictory to their culture. ' 49 And: "There have been
no studies of acts of violence against the Amish. Amish are frequently
helpless, as pacifists, to defend themselves or their property. Members
typically do not report acts of violence or destruction of private property
to law enforcement officials." 50 In these points about the Amish we see the
major themes of the problem of groups: the group as a private government,
and the group as a victim of other private governments and possibly of the
official government itself. If we are discussing the place of group life in a
constitutional system, all of these issues must be discussed together.
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49. Hostetler, The Amish and the Law: A Religious Minority and Its Legal Encounters,
L. REV. 33, 44 (1984).
50. Id. at 46.
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